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It is reasonable to ask whether the WTO’s rules may hamper the ability of national and 
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governments to converge to the relevant international standard for a particular risk 
regulation because such uniformity is likely to reduce the incidence of trade disputes. 
 
Proposals that go beyond environmental advocacy and greater transparency in the 
WTO’s disputes settlement process—changes such as a weakening of the sound 
science requirement and incorporating stronger forms of the precautionary principle 
into WTO agreements on biosecurity laws—reduce due process safeguards against 
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In the WTO forum, global commerce takes precedence over everything—democracy, 
public health, equity, the environment, food safety and more. 
Lori Wallach and Michelle Sforza1 
 
Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-based system would be worthless 
because the rules could not be enforced. 
World Trade Organization2 
 
1. Introduction 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) helps members settle disputes under the rules 
they all agreed to follow. Over 200 disputes have been submitted to the Disputes 
Settlement Body of the WTO since it was set up in 1995.3 This paper is about the 
tension between retaining a free hand in environmental lawmaking and the self-
restraint implied by signing the WTO’s Disputes Settlement Understanding.  
 
Environmentalists consider that the rulings of WTO’s disputes panels encourage 
governments to converge to international standards because uniformity reduces the 
incidence of trade disputes. If these standards serve as ceilings, not floors, the 
incentive for governments to experiment and become genuine pacesetters in 
environmental, biosecurity and food safety law is reduced.  
 
The central concern of environmental groups is that the rulings of disputes panels may 
restrict domestic environmental laws in advanced countries because they burden 
imports unduly or are without full scientific justification. The WTO’s rules may also stop 
industrialised countries from employing trade restrictions to pressure other 
governments to improve environmental quality and protect endangered species.  
 
Environmental groups have proposed changes to the WTO to ensure that trade rules: 
are not be used to weaken national or international health and environmental 
standards; encourage environmental progress and discourage environmental harm; 
and are developed and implemented through open and fully democratic procedures.4 
New Zealand considers that legitimate environmental concerns do need to be 
                                                 
*  My thanks to Peter Martin, Wayne Stevens, Mario Di Mao, Simon Hay, Alistair Dixon, 
Linda Cameron, Brett Longley, David Wood, Chris Pinfield, and David Pine for their 
comments on drafts. 
1   Wallach, L. and Sforza, M. 1999, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization 
and the Erosion of Democracy, Public Citizen, Washington, D.C. p. 7. 
2   World Trade Organization 2001,  Setting disputes, The WTO’s ‘most individual 
contribution’, World Trade Organization Home Page, no date, 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, visited 22 October 2001. 
3   The WTO’s disputes panels are not courts. If a dispute cannot be resolved bilaterally, the 
complaining country may request the establishment of a disputes panel made up of 
independent experts. If the country that is the target of the complaint does not accept the 
recommendations of the panel (or the Appellate Body if the panel's decision is appealed), 
and no other accommodation is found, all the WTO’s Disputes Settlement Body can do is 
endorse a request by the complaining member to impose limited bilateral trade sanctions. 
4   Sierra Club, A Fair Trade Bill of Rights, Sierra Club Home Page, no date, 
www.sierraclub.org/trade/ftaa/rights.asp, visited 5 May 2001.   3
integrated better with international trade agreements. However, these concerns should 
not be used to protect against fair competition from the developing countries.5 
 
If New Zealand wishes to renegotiate or withdraw from treaty commitments, generally 
international law provides a mechanism for doing so. Where commitments are 
reciprocal, others who were the beneficiaries of our now revised commitments may be 
induced to withdraw some of the commitments they made to us. International law 
emerged from the pursuit by nations of self-interested policies on the international 
stage. Treaties arise largely from a coincidence of national self-interest. For example, 
the WTO was established in 1995 because all 130 nations who signed the Treaty of 
Marrakech in 1994 found enough of their national interests in the document that was on 
the negotiating table to make it worth their while to sign it. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section two will discuss why trade has become an 
environmental issue. Section three will discuss the trade agenda of the international 
environmental movement. Section four will discuss the relevant rules of the WTO. 
Section five will discuss the precautionary principle. Section six will discuss the 
integration of technological and democratic values into risk regulation. Section seven 
will discuss the constraints the WTO’s agreements imply for pace-setting in 
environmental legislation. Section eight will summarise the paper. 
 
2. Why has trade become an environmental issue? 
2.1. The trigger events 
International agreements such as those establishing the WTO represent a growing and 
increasingly controversial body of international economic law. In common with a 
number of treaties, the WTO agreements have verification mechanisms to monitor 
adherence and to help members settle disputes. 
 
Prior to the 1990s, environmentalists did not see a role for themselves in international 
trade negotiations. Trade officials had little interest in environmental policy: 
No mention is made of the word environment in the original General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — the central pillar of the international trading system—
negotiated just after World War II. At that time, no one saw much connection between 
trade liberalization and environmental protection. For the next forty years, trade and 
environmental policymakers pursued their respective agendas on parallel tracks that 
rarely, if ever, intersected.6 
Everything changed in the 1990s. There were four trigger events. 
 
The first trigger event was the negotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).7 Some U.S. environmentalists expected significant 
environmental harm would flow from NAFTA due to increased trade with a developing 
country either directly or through cross-border migration of polluting industries to 
                                                
5   Speech From The Throne Opening Of Parliament 1999. 
6   Esty, D. 1999, “Economic Integration and the Environment”, in Vig, N. and Axelrod, R. 
(eds),  The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy, Washington, D.C. CQ 
Press, p. 190. 
7   Esty,  D.  1994,  Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, Institute of 
International Economics, pp. 27ff.   4
Mexico. There was a separate growing interest among environmental groups in using 
trade restrictions to influence environmental outcomes at home and abroad. 
 
Some politically shrewd American environmentalists saw NAFTA as an opportunity to 
address pre-existing environmental issues, including those along the US-Mexico 
border.8 Environmental NGOs perceived trade policy as a new means of raising 
national environmental standards at home and abroad and of inducing countries to 
become signatories to and abide by the increasing number of international 
environmental agreements.9 
 
The second or companion trigger event was the 1991 report of the GATT disputes 
panel on a U.S. import ban on tuna caught off the west coast of Mexico.10 The tuna 
was banned because it was caught in nets that incidentally entangled dolphins. 
 
The disputes panel found that GATT rules do not permit signatory nations to restrict 
imports on the basis of how they are produced outside their legal jurisdiction. The 
response of the GATT panel was a strong assertion of equality in national autonomy, 
emphasising the right of each country, large or small, to decide how products are 
produced within their borders free from threats of unilateral trade sanctions.  
 
The public reaction to the tuna/dolphin decision of the GATT permanently transformed 
trade policy. For environmentalists, the tuna-dolphin dispute seemed to subordinate 
national environmental law to trade concerns. American environmental groups 
considered that trade rules that forbid the differentiation between production methods 
made it impossible for national governments to adopt an aggressive approach to 
environmental protection both at home and abroad. It raised the spectre of domestic 
environmental laws being routinely challenged and overturned by a far away 
international trade tribunal with no environmental sensitivity or expertise. 
 
The third trigger event was the beef hormones dispute between the USA and the 
European Union (EU). In 1996, a WTO disputes panel ruled that the EU’s beef 
hormone ban was illegal even though the ban treated domestic and foreign products 
alike. The ban was considered to lack scientific justification and was not the subject of 
a proper risk assessment. The decision affirmed prior suspicions of environmental 
groups that the WTO would not properly safeguard a country's right to protect human, 
animal and plant life or health, and to establish the level of protection from risk that it 
chooses.   
 
The final straw was the April 1998 report of the WTO disputes panel on the shrimp-
turtle case. The dispute was over U.S. trade sanctions against nations whose fishing 
industry used shrimp nets that incidentally caught and killed turtles — an internationally 
recognised endangered species. U.S. law requires shrimp-exporting nations that trade 
with the U.S. to equip their shrimp trawlers with turtle excluder devices. India, Malaysia, 
                                                
8   Ibid. 
9   Anderson, K. 1997, “Social Policy Dimensions of Economic Integration: Environmental 
and Labor Standards” in Ito, T. and Krueger, A. (eds) Regionalism versus multilateral 
trade arrangements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 57-84; and 
Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. 1992, “Trade, the Environment and Public Policy” in 
Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. (eds) The greening of world trade issues, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, pp. 3-22. 
10   Esty, op cit, pp. 27ff.   5
Pakistan, and Thailand argued that the U.S. ban violated the WTO rules requiring non-
discrimination among countries and prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports. 
 
The World Wildlife Fund International considered the Shrimp-Turtle dispute to be 
arguably the most important environmental case ever before the WTO.11  It raised the 
critical issue of the extent to which nations can unilaterally restrict the import of products 
whose production threatens endangered species and harms the global environment.  
 
Most proponents of unilateral trade measures accept that multilateral environmental 
responses are the first choice. However, multilateral solutions are not always available. 
It is said that situations will arise in which serious environmental harm is about to occur, 
there is no more time to wait for agreed international action, and only unilateral action 
by individual countries can mitigate the harm. Other responses such as voluntary eco-
labelling may not be a practical alternative for addressing process and production 
methods that cause immediate or irreversible environmental damage abroad. 
 
The Shrimp-Turtle disputes panel said in 1998 that if a country was able to condition 
market access for a product to the adoption by the exporting country of certain 
conservation policies, the WTO’s agreements could no longer serve as a multilateral 
trade framework. It is difficult to think of a way to effectively contain the cross-border 
assertion of conservation priorities. If one WTO member were allowed to adopt such 
measures, other members have the right to follow suit. If that happened, it would be 
difficult for exporting countries to comply with multiple conflicting process and 
production method policy requirements. 
 
The WTO’s Appellate Body overturned the Shrimp-Turtle panel’s ruling, holding the 
U.S. measure was provisionally justified on conservation grounds, but were applied in a 
way that was arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. The Appellate Body determined 
that the U.S. procedures for deciding whether countries met the requirements of the 
law did not provide adequate due process. It also found that the United States had 
unfairly discriminated between the complaining countries and Western Hemisphere 
nations. The U.S. gave four months notice to some Asian nations. Other nations were 
given three years. Considerable importance was attached to the failure of the U.S. to 
conduct serious, across-the-board negotiations to conclude bilateral or multilateral 
agreements before enforcing the unilateral import prohibition. 
 
The U.S. amended the turtle conservation law in response to the Appellant Body’s 
report. Malaysia complained to the WTO about these amendments in October 2000. A 
WTO disputes panel released a report in June 2001 finding that the implementation of 
the U.S. sea turtle protection law was now fully consistent with the WTO’s rules and it 
complied with earlier recommendations of the WTO Appellate Body. The WTO disputes 
panel recognised the efforts of the U.S. to negotiate a sea turtle conservation 
agreement with the Indian Ocean and South-East Asian nations affected by the law, 
and to provide technical assistance in the adoption of fishing methods that do not 
cause incidental harm to endangered sea turtles. 
 
                                                
11   World Wildlife Fund for Nature International 1998, WWF Legal Briefing The Final Report 
of the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Panel, Home Page of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
International, www.panda.org/resources/publications/sustainability/wto-papers.   6
2.2. Nations have different environmental policies 
In the end, the conflict between international trade law and environmental protection 
arises from the simple fact that nations have different environmental policies in what is 
an increasingly integrated world. At one end of the spectrum, there are the "high-level" 
or industrialised countries, which have rigorous laws that are vigorously enforced. At 
the other end of the spectrum are "low-level" or developing countries. These countries 
have equally rigorous environmental laws that are not so rigorously enforced, or they 
have less rigorous laws, or they have no laws at all.12 
 
The conflict about differences in environmental policies, previously low-key, has 
enjoyed a major public and business community profile lately because of the success 
of trade liberalisation. The business community has become increasingly concerned 
about the use of health, safety and environmental regulations as non-tariff barriers. 
 
By the end of the 1980s, average tariff rates on industrial goods had dropped by almost 
a factor of three since the 1960s to about 5 per cent in Japan, the United States and 
the European Union. The growing competition from abroad focused attention on cost-
raising social policies and on the diversity in cross-country intra-industry environmental 
standards that were previously thought to be small change.13  
 
International public awareness of environmental issues coincided with trade 
liberalisation and the later rise to prominence of the WTO’s disputes panels. 
Environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s manifested itself as concern about 
national and regional pollution problems in the advanced economies.14 
 
Starting in the 1980s, there was a much more intense second wave of public interest in 
environmental issues and this spread across national borders. Ozone depletion and 
global warming emerged as major environmental themes.15 
 
Public concern has since gone beyond managing the global commons and trans-
border spill-overs – matters usually handled through bilateral and multilateral treaties – 
to conservation issues such as resource depletion, species extinction and animal 
welfare, all regardless of national boundaries. There is a view that we have obligations 
beyond borders. Individual countries are seen as custodians of particular resources for 
the common benefit of humanity. Individual nations are said to have the right to take 
unilateral action to protect that common environmental heritage wherever it may be 
located, both in general, and in response to failed international negotiations.16 
 
Just as the environmental debate internationalised, the standing of the world trading 
system was enhanced considerably on 1 January 1995 when the WTO came into 
                                                
12    Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T. N. 1996, “Trade and the Environment: Does 
Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?”, in Bhagwati, J. and 
Hudec, R. (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization:  Prerequisites for free trade? Vol. 1, 
Cambridge and London, MIT Press, pp. 159-223. 
13   Anderson op cit. and Anderson and Blackhurst op cit. 
14   Ibid. 
15   Ibid. 
16   Ibid.   7
existence. The WTO enforces trade rules negotiated in the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 
The WTO’s rules go well beyond the GATT in constraining non-tariff barriers and 
address government procurement, subsidies, and product standards, and new areas 
such as trade in services. The agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
measures allows nations to set their own biosecurity and food safety standards, but 
requires that they be based on science and do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between countries and products with the same or similar conditions. 
 
2.3. Conservation is global, environmental protection is local 
The position of environmental NGOs is nuanced. Their initial concerns arose out of the 
limits the GATT’s dispute panels imposed on the unilateral cross-border assertion of 
conservation priorities. Trans-national priorities about endangered species and 
habitats, the global commons and forests were held to be more important than national 
(regulatory) sovereignty. Several early WTO disputes panel rulings against anti-
pollution and food safety laws revealed a preference among the environmental NGOs 
for regulatory heterogeneity and an opposition to international convergence and 
regulatory harmonisation of biosecurity, pollution and food safety laws.  
 
The views of environmentalists on decentralisation and national autonomy vary. 
Conservation usually calls for trans-national action to reduce resource depletion. This 
straightforward objective is the same at local, national and international forums. 
 
Environmental protection is a local/national issue albeit with some important 
exceptions. The details count: local tastes, conditions, and concerns will vary from 
place to place. Environmental regulation is about the control of input and output mixes, 
is information intensive, and is sensitive to local geography and history (including 
previous levels of pollution), and community preferences and wealth. The cost of 
achieving a given level of air or water quality depends on the level of industrial activity, 
the composition of that activity, its spatial dispersion, and the surrounding 
topographical and climatic conditions — all of which vary between and within countries.  
 
The benefits from a particular environmental standard depend on the extent and 
vulnerability of nearby receptors. There may be crops that are particularly sensitive to 
air pollution or fisheries that are particularly vulnerable to water pollutants. The capacity 
to absorb pollution varies between places and countries. The standards that are 
relevant to crowded cities have less relevance to sparsely populated rural areas. In 
addition, inter-jurisdictional competition promotes the discovery of new environmental 
protection strategies. More progressive jurisdictions can be pacesetters in improving 
environmental protection. The resulting improvements in environmental amenity in one 
place will lead voters in other jurisdictions to demand similar reforms to catch-up. 
 
The rest of this paper will focus on international trade laws that restrict domestic 
environmental laws, such as bio-security and food safety laws. The sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and beef hormones case will be the focus. Most 
environmental concerns that relate to domestic environmental law were touched on 
during this dispute. National laws aimed at foreign environmental practices — the 
cross-border assertion of conservation priorities — are outside the scope of this paper. 
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3. The trade agenda of the environmental movement 
The WTO is about what is traded and limits discrimination by member-governments 
against imports on the basis of how they were made and what they were made from.  
 
WTO member-nations can regulate domestic production and any associated harm or 
externalities (pollution and other spill-overs) as they please. 
 
When governments regulate consumption-generated environmental and other harm or 
spill-overs, the WTO requires that there must be no discrimination against imports 
substantively or in the administration of the law. Regulators are expected to be blind to 
the source or national origin of a product. Regulatory and biosecurity standards should 
apply equally to local-made products and imports. They should have at least a 
provisional scientific justification; and should follow a proper risk assessment.  
 
There is a growing approval by the WTO’s disputes panels of environmental measures 
that restrict imports that are externally goals, such as those that are designed to protect 
internationally recognised endangered species abroad that are unilateral, but lack full 
authorisation in an international environmental or conservation agreement.17 
 
Environmental NGOs are interested in how things are made as well as what is 
traded.18 In addition to risking a lowering of biosecurity and food safety standards to 
weaker international levels, NGOs consider that the WTO’s disputes rulings have 
eroded the ability of countries to regulate imports based on how they were made. 
Importing nations can no longer ensure that their consumption patterns encouraged 
responsible forestry abroad or the preservation of endangered species everywhere.19  
 
Environmental NGOs consider that the true test of any national law under the WTO’s 
disputes settlement rules will be whether it promotes trade. They stand in direct 
opposition to WTO and GATT rules that usually do not permit signatory nations to 
restrict imports on the basis of how they are produced outside their legal jurisdiction. 
Trade rules deny consumers the right to use democratic means to limit import access 
to those goods produced abroad in ways that minimise environmental damage.20  
 
                                                
17   A number of countries, including New Zealand, believe that it is prudent to address the 
possibility that measures inconsistent with WTO’s rules might be applied pursuant to 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Direct conflict between the core concerns 
of the WTO and MEAs is unlikely. Under international law, a more specialised treaty such 
as an MEA will over-ride obligations in the WTO agreements for those nations that signed 
the more specialised treaty. The WTO has 144 members. Most or all major nations have 
ratified the three major MEAs: endangered species, the ozone layer and the trans-
boundary movements of hazardous wastes. No MEA sanctioned trade measures have 
been challenged in the WTO, and it is unlikely that there would be such a challenge.  
18   Esty 1999, op cit. p. 203. 
19   Sierra  Club,  Broken Promises: How the Clinton Administration is Trading Away Our 
Environment, Sierra Club Home Page, no date, 
www.sierraclub.org/trade/articles/brokenpromises/broken.asp , visited 5 May 2001. 
20   Ibid.   9
When the agenda of environmentalists and trade officials crossed in the early 1990s, 
there was a strong clash of cultures.21 There were distinct goals, traditions, procedures 
and even language that defined each group: 
•  Environmentalists assign large weights to environmental and health damage 
and little weight to abatement costs; 
•  The business community assigns great weight to abatement costs and low 
weight to environmental damage;22 
•  Environmentalists emphasise process such as public participation and open 
decision-making: open discussion clarifies issues, separates fact from opinion 
and narrows the range of scientific uncertainty;23  
•  Trade negotiators emphasis outcomes such as concluding agreements and 
liberalising trade and the necessity of secrecy in the negotiation phase, all of 
which is conducted at the government-to-government level;24 
•  Trade officials use economics and pursue trade liberalisation as a means to 
raise living standards at home and abroad;  
•  Environmentalists rely on legal institutions to advance their goals and fear that 
growth results in more pollution and environmental degradation; and25  
•  Environmentalists are impatient for action — many international agreements 
have sweeping goals but offer little or no plan for achieving those goals.26 
All in all, each group focuses on different public choice risks. Trade officials are 
concerned with containing the power of sectional interests to manipulate public policy. 
Environmental groups give priority to fostering public deliberation in democratic 
decision-making. Striking the right balance is an enduring democratic dilemma. 
 
Many of the concerns of the environmental movement about international trade law 
arise from the possibility that trade disputes will be resolved by WTO panels in ways 
that subordinates environmental outcomes to trade liberalisation.  
 
The best single articulation of the international trade law reform agenda of the 
environmental movement, as it has evolved since 1991, in terms of conciseness, clarity 
and comprehensiveness, has been by the Sierra Club USA in 1994: 
1.  All units of government should be able to make their environmental regulations and 
programs as strong as they wish, unrestricted by trade policy, provided that their 
regulations apply equally to domestic and foreign products (i.e., are non-
discriminatory);  
2.  These environmental regulations should not be limited in stringency by upper limits set 
by international bodies or trade institutions;  
3.  Nor should they be subject to standards of acceptability set by international trade 
institutions; conflicts between trade and environmental policy should be resolved by 
impartial bodies;  
                                                
21   Esty 1994, opt cit. 
22   Esty, D. and Mendelsohn, R. 1998, “Moving from national to international environmental 
policy”, Policy Sciences, Vo. 31, pp. 225-235. 
23   Ibid. 
24   Esty 1994, op cit. 
25   Ibid. 
26   Esty and Mandelsohn op cit.   10
4.  Trade institutions should operate in an open and accountable manner which permits 
public participation; normal deliberative practices should not be suspended when trade 
agreements are approved by national legislative bodies;  
5.  Nations should be able to restrict imports into and exports from their national territory 
on a non-discriminatory basis in order to pursue bona fide environmental objects, such 
as enacting "life cycle" product responsibility laws; laws designed to keep products 
harmful to the environment out of circulation; to prevent resource depletion both at 
home and abroad; to protect endangered species and habitats anywhere; and to enforce 
international environmental conventions;  
6.  There should be no presumption that trade agreements prevail in cases of conflict with 
international environmental conventions, nor should the scope of such conventions be 
limited by trade doctrine; and  
7.  Governments should be able to provide subsidies to encourage good environmental 
practices, as in agriculture, without being precluded from doing so by trade policies. 27 
Other NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund, the Friends of the Earth International, 
Public Citizen, and Greenpeace International articulate their own agendas.28  
 
The policy position of the Sierra Club is a convenient single summary of the common 
themes of NGOs about the tensions between a free hand in environmental law-making 
and the self-restraint implied by signing the WTO disputes settlement understanding. 
The agenda of the Sierra Club focuses on the powers that national authorities should 
not fetter with treaties. The aim is to ensure that international standards do not act as 
regulatory ceilings and there is scope for governments to experiment and become 
pacesetters in environmental law. The implications and risks of this agenda cannot be 
evaluated without discussing the rules of the WTO. That is the purpose of the next 
section. 
 
4. The WTO as policed decentralisation 
A wide array of policy instruments can protect domestic firms against imports. As tariffs 
have declined, there is a concern that product standards have been increasingly used 
to limit imports and add unnecessarily to the costs of trade. 
 
Both the WTO and the GATT have an underlying political logic. The GATT encouraged 
exporters to join to lobby for tariff cuts at home in expectation of matching cuts abroad. 
The WTO encourages members to make matching commitments over proper 
regulatory design and implementation. The aim is due process, not harmonisation. 
 
The objective is to channel the domestic political discourse of member-countries 
towards regulatory measures that do not overly restrict trade.29 
                                                
27   Sierra Club 1994,  Sierra Club Conservation Policies International Trade Policy, Sierra 
Club Home Page, www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/trade.asp, visited 18 October 
2001; and Sierra Club 1999, White Paper on Environmentally Responsible Trade 
Negotiating Authority, 26 April, Sierra Club Home Page, 
 www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/white.asp, visited 5 May 2001. 
28   See Sek, L., Pregelj, V., and Wilson, A. 2000, RL30521: The World Trade Organization: 
The Debate in the United States, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for 
Congress, 12 April, Home Page of the National Library for the Environment, 
www.cnie.org/nle/inter-42.html, visited 21 May 2001, for a summary of the debate in the 
USA about the WTO.   11
 
Regulatory goals can be achieved in many ways. Idiosyncratic policies open 
environmental law to special interest manoeuvring over details of their administration. 
Pesticides and additives with similar health risks are often subject to different 
regulatory targets. New risks are often heavily regulated compared to old risks.  
 
Different sources of identical effluents can be subject to different rules. An example is 
the emission standards on new and old cars. Environmental regulations that mandate a 
particular production process or product design can favour one firm over another, or 
incumbents over new entrants or local over imported products. Environmental laws that 
restrict the output of each member of an industry can affect profits in a manner similar 
to production quotas under a cartel. 
 
Tighter environmental controls (and the associated rise in costs) may increase the 
ability of domestic firms to satisfy anti-dumping injury tests, such as declining market 
share and excess capacity, that trigger other protection against imports via anti-
dumping regulations. Since the early 1980s, industries with increasing pollution 
abatement costs, such as basic metals and chemicals, are prominent among those 
filing anti-dumping complaints in the USA, EU and Australia. 
 
The majority of traded goods are subject to product standards.30 Such standards raise 
the entry costs for exporters due to product redesign and establishing systems for 
compliance. Standards impose recurrent costs of maintaining quality control, testing, 
and certification, and there is the cost of conformity assessments (whether a product 
conforms to a regulatory requirement).31 Conformity assessments are perceived as 
presenting the largest potential costs for exporters among technical standards.32  
 
Regulatory measures that serve no purpose other than to protect against foreign 
competition will generally be prohibited in politically sophisticated trade agreements, 
even when other more transparent instruments of protection such as tariffs are fully 
permissible.33 If there are no rules in trade agreements about regulatory protectionism, 
the tariff cuts resulting from the agreement can be undone by regulatory stealth. 
 
Regulatory measures that serve honest, non-protectionist objectives are permissible in 
the WTO’s agreements even if their regulatory benefits are small and their adverse 
trade effects large. WTO rules only require that members opt for a less trade-restrictive 
measure when they can, and avoid discriminating against imports in favour of domestic 
products, and that bio-security and food safety laws be based on scientific principles.34 
 
                                                                                                                                          
29    Sykes. A. 1999, "Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade", 66 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 66, Winter, p. 1. 
30   Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 2001, Market Access for 
Developing Countries' Exports, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
Washington, DC, IMF Home Page, www.imf.org/external/np/madc/eng/042701.htm, p. 30. 
31   Ibid. 
32    World Bank 2001, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 
Washington, D.C. 
33   Sykes op cit. 
34   Ibid.   12
The WTO’s rules could be described as policed decentralisation: national regulators 
can go their own way subject to certain mutually agreed process and transparency 
constraints. The principles of policed decentralisation include: 
•  Non-discrimination between local goods and imports from any WTO member; 
•  The sham principle and the scientific evidence requirement — the obligation to 
give reasons, refer to scientific evidence and use risk assessment procedures 
are ways of detecting improper motives; 
•  Transparency requirements (such as notice, consultation and publication); 
•  Generality requirements and least restrictive means (avoid insisting on a few 
particular means of achieving the regulatory objective regardless of their cost 
effectiveness); and 
•  Reference to international standards bodies (to facilitate information exchange 
and dispute resolution).35 
The one thing all sides agree on is there should be no explicit discrimination against 
imports. Imports from any WTO member should be subject to the same environmental, 
biosecurity, food and other product safety laws as local production — there should be 
no regulatory dispensations for imports in general or imports from a particular country. 
 
The challenge from this anti-discrimination position is the pre-1995 trade rules poorly 
handled regulatory measures that, on their face, applied equally to local and imported 
products, but had a significant trade restricting effect through protectionist design. 
Many countries used quarantine instruments such as bans that restricted imports that 
went well beyond what an impartial spectator would regard as necessary to protect bio-
security and food safety. No quarantine measure, no matter how scientifically dubious 
or over-reaching in its geographic scope, but was non-discriminatory in its application 
was ever successfully challenged under the trade rules that applied prior to 1995. 
 
The 1995 sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement broke new ground in allowing 
WTO disputes panels to consider the legitimacy of non-discriminatory regulatory 
measures. The previous rule was that regulations that did not discriminate between 
countries and domestic and foreign producers are perfectly acceptable irrespective of 
the strength of their scientific justification and quality of the risk assessment. The 
agreement on SPS measures allows countries to set their own standards, but requires 
that they be based on science. Countries are encouraged to use international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist. However, they may use 
regulatory measures that result in higher standards if there is scientific justification. 
Countries can also set higher standards based on appropriate assessment of risks so 
long as the approach is consistent, not arbitrary. The SPS agreement also requires 
member countries to be consistent when they deal with risk over a range of measures 
and products, so as to avoid disguised protectionism about specific products. 
 
5. The WTO and the precautionary principle 
The trade issue which perhaps most troubles key international environmental groups, 
such as the World Wildlife Fund for Nature, is the weight and interpretation given to the 
precautionary principle in WTO trade disputes over bio-security and food safety laws.  
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In the eyes of environmentalists, the beef hormone case demonstrated how the SPS 
agreement undermines national health and environmental standards. The World 
Wildlife Fund International considered that the WTO disputes panel decision: 
•  Allowed the WTO to determine the legitimacy of domestic health regulations; 
•  Misinterpreted the provisions of the SPS text that permit countries to determine 
the level of appropriate risk for their citizens; 
•  Preferred lower international standards over higher domestic standards; 
•  Dismissed the precautionary principle as a legitimate basis for health and 
environmental policy; and 
•  Destabilised the international trade regime by inserting itself into a dispute in 
which it lacked the necessary expertise and competence to adjudicate.36 
The WTO ruling was said to have taken aim at the level of health protection the EU 
chose, not trade discrimination. The World Wildlife Fund for Nature had a particular 
concern that the WTO panel dismissed the precautionary principle as a legitimate basis 
for health and environmental policy decision-making. 
 
The Sierra Club considers that the WTO panel was suggesting that with no identifiable 
risk, there is no risk management decision to be made. The Sierra Club considers that 
through the dispute over hormone-treated beef, the WTO established itself as a major 
arbiter of domestic health and safety policy.37 
 
The intention of the SPS agreement is to place some boundaries on the choice of the 
means by which countries achieve their regulatory ends. Signatories to the SPS 
agreement promise to administer food safety laws in a non-discriminatory way. At issue 
is the criteria members must meet in order to show that the law is not a disguised trade 
restriction. The criteria are that SPS measures should be based on sound science, a 
risk assessment, or relevant international standards.  
 
The precautionary principle is where the clash between the two public choice risk 
management agendas of trade negotiators and environmentalists is most ripe. 
Environmental groups gave priority to fostering the greatest possible democratic public 
deliberation about risk regulation. Trade officials are concerned about containing the 
use of risk regulation as a ruse by sectional interests. The precautionary principle is the 
issue where the due process requirements in the SPS and other trade agreements 
clash with a key environmental concern. The precautionary principle is mostly about 
the process of public policy decision-making such as the management of scientific 
uncertainty and weighing of non-scientific factors including public opinion.  
 
The meaning of the precautionary principle varies and along with that, the depth of its 
clash with the SPS agreement. Some argue that a country should have the right to ban 
a product whose long-term health effects are unknown, based on a precautionary 
principle. There is no agreed definition of the precautionary principle. Some suggest 
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using caution in adopting new products where the effects are not clear. Others suggest 
that, until conclusive evidence is presented that the long-term effects are acceptable, a 
product should be banned. The precautionary principle allows countries to err on the 
side of environmental protection when faced with scientific uncertainty. 
 
Box 1: The beef hormones dispute 
The most well-known WTO case on food safety is the U.S. challenge of the EU's ban on imports 
of meat from animals to which any of six hormones have been administered. 
 
The dispute was about whether the EU’s ban was enacted in response to legitimate health 
concerns or to eliminate competition for European beef producers. 
 
The SPS agreement recognises the right of each member to adopt measures it considers 
appropriate to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory, but it also requires 
that these measures be founded on scientific evidence and applied only to the extent necessary 
to achieve the public health goals.  
 
In 1996, a WTO disputes panel ruled that the EU’s beef hormone ban was illegal. The ban was 
considered to lack scientific justification and was not the subject of a proper risk assessment. 
The panel also found that the EU’s applied different levels of protection for comparable 
situations. The EU failed to provide a plausible justification for these differences in levels of 
protection.  The substantial tariff on beef imports into the EU was unaffected by the dispute. 
 
In 1998, the Appellate Body of the WTO found that while a country has broad discretion in 
electing what level of protection it wishes to implement, in doing so it must meet the 
requirements of the SPS agreement. However, in this case, the ban imposed is not rationally 
related to the conclusions of the risk assessments the EU had performed.   
 
The beef hormone decision was finalised in 1999. The EU did not comply with the ruling so after 
a period of negotiation and arbitration, the dispute panel has authorised the USA to suspend 
concessions with respect to certain products from the EU. The value of these sanctions is 
equivalent to an estimate of the annual harm to U.S. exports resulting from the EU’s failure to lift 
its ban on imports of U.S. meat. United States has imposed 100 per cent ad valorem duties on a 
list of EU products with an annual trade value of US$ 116.8 million. 
 
 
The Sierra Club regards the precautionary principle as allowing countries to enforce 
protective standards for health and the environment in the absence of complete 
scientific information. The Club considers that EU’s zero-risk standard for beef 
hormone use was based on the precautionary principle, recognised in international 
environmental law.38 The Sierra Club admits that absolute scientific certainty of a 
substance's effect on human health is a difficult standard to meet.39 The Friends of the 
Earth cast a similar broad net arguing for what could be called the strong form of the 
precautionary principle. If the risks are not yet known, and thus little or no scientific 
evidence exists, the precautionary principle justifies a ban. 
 
The SPS agreement, as its stands, could be considered to be incorporating a weak 
version of the precautionary principle. The WTO’s rules allow a member country, in 
cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, to provisionally adopt sanitary 
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or phytosanitary measures on the basis of the available pertinent information. In such 
circumstances, WTO members must seek the additional information necessary for a 
more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time. The SPS agreement does not define 
scientific evidence. It is not clear how many scientific studies, or what degree of 
scientific certitude, is necessary to determine that a measure is scientifically sound. 
 
The strong form of the precautionary principle provides for a zero tolerance of new 
risks that are not well understood. The strong form requires regulators to not allow 
exposure to a substance until it has been proved safe, rather than allowing unregulated 
exposure until there is conclusive scientific evidence that the substance is harmful.   
 
The strong form of the precautionary principle is based on the premise that science 
does not always provide the information or insights necessary to take protective action 
effectively or in a timely manner and that undesirable and potentially irreversible effects 
may result if action is not taken until science provides such insights. 
 
The weak form of the precautionary principle provides for interim bans when there is 
scientific uncertainty and an on-going obligation to keep searching for new information. 
However, under the weak form, the uncertainty itself must be cast in terms of scientific 
reasoning, not hypothesis and hazard identification. 
 
To invoke the precautionary principle on a basis consistent with the SPS agreement, 
there must be some scientific information indicating a risk exists. The alternative 
proposed by the environmental movement turns the strong form of the precautionary 
principle into an unbounded commitment to avoid new risks.  
 
Precaution should be part of a science-based approach to regulation, not a substitute 
for such an approach. This is the central difference between the weak and strong forms 
of the precautionary principle. Incorporation of the strong form of the precautionary 
principle into the SPS agreement would undermine its fundamental objective of 
encouraging science-based regulation.  
 
WTO dispute panels require only that there be a rational relationship between the 
policy choices made by governments and objective scientific assessments that go 
beyond hypothesis or hazard identification. 
 
The requirement to refer to scientific evidence eliminates recourse to a stonewalling 
strategy of declarations rather than explanations, used to great effect in the defence of 
protectionist SPS measures prior to the Uruguay Round. 
 
The stronger the form of the precautionary principle that signatories to the SPS 
agreement are allowed to use, the less predictable are trade rules, and the greater are 
the opportunities for countries to use regulatory precaution to disguise protectionism.    
 
6. Integrating technological and democratic values into risk regulation 
The role of the precautionary principle leads into the larger issue of the sound science 
requirement in the SPS agreement. The requirement for sound science gives 
technological values a greater weight than the environmental movement consider they 
should have in how risk regulation is conceived.  
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By requiring bio-security and food safety standards to be based on a risk assessment, 
environmentalists consider that the SPS agreement eliminates the possibility that a 
society's values influence regulation. This is the dilemma. The sound science 
requirement also makes it more difficult for special interests to influence the design of 
regulation to the disadvantage of import competition. 
 
For the environmental movement, the beef hormone case demonstrated that the SPS 
agreement attempts to eliminate non-science factors from standard setting.40 While 
science plays a valuable role in informing such decisions, a number of environmental 
groups argue that it is ultimately the legislature that must make a political decision 
about how much risk society will face. The environmental movement considers that 
political judgments always play a central role in policy-making.41 
 
The environmental movement considers that, by requiring standards to be based on 
risk assessments, the SPS agreement eliminates the possibility that a society's values, 
such as the prevention of exposure to a highly toxic substance in the presence of 
uncertainty about the chemical's effects at low doses, should outweigh the uncertain 
outcome of a risk assessment.42 
 
Many studies have shown that there are systematic differences between expert and 
citizen judgments about risk.43 Experts focus principally on aggregate lives at stake 
and the stewardship of limited resources. Citizens in a democratic society base their 
decisions on reflective judgments. They care not simply about the aggregate amount of 
lives lost and injuries sustained, but also about a range of factors involving the nature 
and context of the particular risk.44 For many people, salient contextual features of risk 
include: 
1.  The catastrophic nature of the risk; 
2.  Whether the risk is subject to personal control or is uncontrollable; 
3.  Whether the risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; 
4.  Whether the risk is voluntarily incurred;  
5.  How equitably distributed the danger is or how concentrated on identifiable, 
innocent, minorities or traditionally disadvantaged victims;  
6.  Children are at special risk; 
7.  Future generations are at risk; 
8.  How well understood the risk in question is;  
9.  How familiar the risk is - new or old or subject to heavy media coverage; 
10. Whether the source of the risk is human in origin or created by nature; 
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11. Whether trust in relevant institutions is low or high; 
12. Whether the timing of adverse effects is delayed or immediate; 
13. Whether the mechanisms causing the risk are poorly or well understood; 
14. Whether there is a history of past accidents; and 
15. Whether the accompanying benefits of incurring the risk are clear or invisible.45 
Some of these differences between expert and lay opinion and risk regulation can be 
attributed to a lack of knowledge and cognitive short cuts. People are often willing to 
pay a premium to avoid bad deaths: deaths that are especially dreaded, uncontrollable, 
involuntarily incurred, and inequitably distributed. Public judgments of this kind help 
explain the demand for risk regulation.46  But some of these judgments do not justify 
current policies, because they stem from selective attention. Some risks appear as 
background noise, whereas other quantitatively identical risks cause enormous 
concern. Some people tend to think that an event is more likely when its occurrence 
can come readily to mind. It may be for this reason that people think that deaths from 
accidents occur much more often than deaths from disease, when the numbers may be 
the same. Public attention will be a partial artefact of the media, which tends to 
emphasis unusual and provocative events rather than chronic risks. 
 
Many of the differences between citizens and experts have nothing to do with 
misunderstanding of the facts or causal mechanisms. They involve values.  
 
Ordinary citizens make reflective judgements that care about a range of other 
variables: whether risks are equitably distributed, faced by future generations, 
especially dreaded, well understood, and voluntarily incurred. Citizen judgments on 
these points are entirely reasonable and deserve respect in a democracy.  
 
The environmental movement is correct in identifying a social dilemma over the 
incorporation of technological and democratic values in risk regulation. 
 
The challenge is to distinguish between judgments that are products of factual 
mistakes and selective attention and judgments that result from differences in values. 
The sound science and risk assessment requirements promote better priority-setting by 
ensuring that regulation is targeted at non-trivial risks. Regulatory agencies should not 
focus their attention on relatively small problems at the expense of larger ones. 
 
Sound science and risk assessment informs public judgment, fosters least-cost 
compliance, and focuses on results rather than methods and processes. The 
requirement for a scientific justification and a risk assessment are ways of diminishing 
sectional lobbying and ensuring that the consequences of regulation are available for 
public inspection and review. The requirements in the SPS agreement may facilitate 
rather than frustrate the incorporation of democratic values into risk regulation. 
 
Values-based concerns such as whether risks are equitably distributed, or are faced by 
children or future generations, or results in especially dreaded deaths, or are voluntarily 
incurred, or the risk is human or nature in origin, usually pre-supposes that there is 
valid scientific basis for the feared risk. The SPS agreement sets a relatively low 
(internationally agreed) threshold test for the basic processes to ensure that this is so.  
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Steps that reduce the role of factual mistakes and the biases resulting from selective 
attention foster public deliberation, which is a goal of the environmental movement, and 
curbs the influence of special interests, which is a goal of multilateral trade negotiators. 
The SPS agreement facilitates both agendas by promoting discussion and deliberation. 
 
Public deliberation has long been considered an essential component of democracy. 
Every society contains innumerable groups, opinions and political conflicts. These 
differences are handled by citizens trying to persuade each other and voting. However, 
democracies usually aspire to have a degree of reflection, deliberation, and exposure 
to other viewpoints, and not merely the expression of fixed preferences at elections.47 
Democracies require public debate or deliberation prior to decision-making.48 
 
Government based on the consent of the governed must find ways to mobilise that 
consent and to refine and enlarge the public view.49 This requires discussion among 
citizens aimed at setting the agenda for public issues, proposing alternative solutions to 
the problems on the agenda, supporting those solutions with reasons, and concluding 
by settling on some alternative. This is, at bottom, a public process which requires the 
participation and reasoned judgment of the people, with a broad public orientation 
toward reaching right answers rather than serving narrow interests.50  
 
The SPS agreement is founded on the principles of dialogue and public deliberation. A 
policy issue can depend on information, about which a variety of reasonable viewpoints 
can discuss and agree about, or on values, for which agreement is difficult. Discussion 
and debate among people of genuinely different perspectives and positions first 
requires each to explain their position in a way others understand. Discussion is likely 
to lead to better outcomes, if only because competing views are stated and exchanged: 
In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality and widens 
our perspective; we are made to see things from the standpoint of others and the limits 
of our vision are brought home to us .... The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that 
even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No 
one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all the same inferences that 
they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging 
the range of arguments.51 
The SPS agreement allows countries to set their own risk standards, but requires that 
they give reasons for the standards in a language others can understand and discuss.  
 
A public deliberative process is necessary in order to define the right questions and the 
range of alternatives for managing a given risk. Many people modify or adjust their 
views after subjecting them to public scrutiny. Deliberation brings out new information 
and perspectives which may be essential to the formation of sound public policy about 
risk regulation. Deliberation is a useful way for handling differences of opinion about 
risk regulation since the strength of the argument takes precedence over the status of 
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the arguers. Deliberation is most necessary when there may be reasons for deciding 
on one course of action, but equally compelling reasons for deciding on another. 
 
By encouraging science-based justifications for risk regulations, other justifications, 
such as values, are brought more into the open by the SPS agreement. This obligation, 
arising from the SPS agreement, to offer explicit reasons for regulation helps ensure 
that where differences between technocratic and popular opinion about regulating a 
particular risk is indeed the product of differences in values, rather than factual 
mistakes or selective attention, reasonable steps are taken to make that transparent. 
 
7. Technological progress in public policy—pace-setting governments 
The environmental movement considers that the SPS agreement creates incentives to 
not exceed international standards in order to reduce instances of trade disputes. 
 
The environmental movement considers that the SPS agreement and the WTO’s 
disputes settlement understanding act to encourage governments to use international 
standards in bio-security, food safety and risk regulation because such uniformity is 
likely to reduce the incidence of trade disputes. 
 
Environmental NGOs fear WTO disputes decisions could lead to international 
standards serving as ceilings, not floors, curtailing innovative solutions to public health 
problems that are ahead of the international status quo.52 
 
In countries with regulations higher than the international standard, the fear of 
environmental NGOs is WTO related pressure to harmonise the regulations down to 
the international standard. For example, a failure to prove a scientific basis for a higher-
level regulation could result in an adverse WTO disputes panel ruling. The end result 
might be a weakening of regulations that environmentalists have fought so hard to 
achieve. Public Citizen explains the risks as follows: 
International harmonization can occur at the lowest or highest level of public health, 
worker safety, or environmental protection. However, the TACD strongly believes that 
in the instances when international harmonization of standards is appropriate, it must 
result in the adoption of best available technology and embody the highest levels of 
consumer protection. Unfortunately, the actual provisions of the WTO requiring 
harmonization or providing incentives for harmonization generally promote the 
lowering of the best existing domestic public health, food safety, economic justice, 
natural resource conservation and product safety standards. For instance, under the 
WTO, international standards do not serve as a floor that all countries must meet. 
Rather, they serve as a ceiling. The agreements provide for the challenge of any 
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domestic standards that go beyond international standards in providing greater citizen 
safeguards, but contain no provisions for challenging lax standards.53 
Environmental groups often cite WTO complaints brought by the United States against 
high-level regulations of other governments as examples of this downward pressure. 
The beef hormones complaint against the EU involved a claim that the hormone ban 
serves no valid regulatory purpose, because there was no scientific evidence that the 
hormone-produced meat contains harmful substances. Environmental critics who 
object to this ruling argue that its implicit minimum risk standard for harmful effects is 
too high and contend that WTO rules may override many existing risk regulations.54 
 
The environmental movement does have a point about pace-setting governments 
falling foul of the WTO process. An important criticism of harmonisation is that it 
prevents innovation and suppresses diversity consistent with local conditions. The beef 
hormone case may imply that the WTO could, at times, penalise diversity and 
experimentation in environmental and product safety legislation such as that 
championed by the environmental movement. 
 
The willingness to tolerate risks is higher in some countries than in others. The costs 
and benefits of regulation often vary geographically. Citizens of wealthier jurisdictions, 
for example, may be willing to pay more to protect health, safety, the environment, and 
the like than citizens of poorer jurisdictions. The tastes of citizens may also vary across 
jurisdictions in ways that affect the costs and benefits of regulation. A common defence 
of low environmental standards in developing countries is that those countries are too 
poor to afford anything better. 
 
The same risk tolerance rationale can be used to defend differences between rich 
countries in risk regulation. Many risk regulations will increase the price paid by 
consumers. The willingness of consumers to pay to reduce risk will tend to rise with per 
capita income. Individuals on higher incomes prefer to spend more on safety and 
quality. They are members of societies that are less tolerant of these risks. 
 
There is a respectable argument that international regulatory harmonisation is the 
exception to the best case, and that it is nationally and internationally socially 
productive to respect regulatory heterogeneity.55 The benefits that a local citizenry 
derives from a particular regulation, and its willingness to bear the costs, will commonly 
differ across jurisdictions. The optimal regulatory policy will differ across jurisdictions. 
Local government officials will often be drawn from the local population and will have 
closer connections to local constituencies, resulting in better knowledge of local 
preferences about regulatory issues. Local representatives to central governments will 
often represent a small minority of the central governing bodies and have insufficient 
influence on policy outcomes to ensure the proper degree of regulatory heterogeneity. 
 
A valid concern about the WTO is its rules and the perceived conservative or 
convergence bias of its disputes settlement panels will discourage policy innovation by 
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pace-setting governments at national and sub-national levels and slow the migration of 
those policies to other jurisdictions. Public Citizen expressed its concerns thus: 
Harmonization is the name given to the effort by industry to replace the variety of 
product standards and other regulatory policies adopted by nations in favour of uniform 
global standards. The harmonization effort gained a significant boost with the approval 
of several new international agreements, particularly the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which established the World Trade Organization (WTO). These pacts 
require or encourage national governments to harmonize standards or accept different, 
foreign standards as "equivalent" on issues as diverse as auto, food and worker safety, 
pharmaceutical testing standards and informational labelling of products. These trade 
agreements have also established an ever-increasing number of committees and working 
groups to implement the harmonization mandate. The WTO alone established over 50. 
Unfortunately, most of these working groups are industry dominated, do not provide an 
opportunity for input by interested individuals or potentially-affected communities, and 
generally conduct their operations behind closed doors. Yet, under current trade rules, 
these standard-setting processes can directly affect our national, state and local 
policies.56 
The decentralisation concepts implicit in the environmentalist critique of the WTO are: 
•  Laboratory federalism; and  
•  Environmental federalism. 
In a setting of imperfect information with learning-by-doing, laboratory federalism 
focuses on the potential gains from experimentation with policies for addressing social 
and economic problems. A federal system offers opportunities to encourage such 
experimentation and thus promote technical progress in public policy. A single 
jurisdiction may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. Multiple jurisdictions allow 
simultaneous experimentation with competing policies. Localised policy 
experimentation has the advantages of risking harm in a more circumscribed area, of 
being able to correct mistakes quickly because governments are closer to and thus 
more easily removable by the people. Many important social and economic policies 
were tried first at state or local levels before becoming commonplace as other 
governments, includes those abroad, built on the success of pace-setting jurisdictions.  
 
A valid environmental concern about the WTO disputes process is that it may frustrate 
a trans-national version of environmental federalism. One purpose of federalism and 
indeed nation states is diversity in law. There is more to federalism than a calculated 
inefficiency: a divided government is a weak government.57  
 
The main argument for federalism, and political decentralisation in general, is that there 
are a range of government activities for which there is no particular need for a national 
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policy.58 Responsibility for a particular activity of government should lie with the 
smallest political jurisdiction that is familiar with local circumstances and needs. 
 
A key idea emerging from the literature in public economics is that the responsibility for 
providing a particular public service should be assigned to the smallest jurisdiction 
whose geographical scope encompasses the relevant benefits and costs associated 
with the provision of the service. The rationale is that decentralisation allows public 
services to be tailored to the particular circumstances – the tastes of residents, the 
costs of production, and any other peculiar local features – of each jurisdiction. 
Decentralisation offer ways to reduce these costs by providing experiments with 
different policies, by making it easier for citizens to monitor their political agents, and by 
giving citizens alternative jurisdictions from which to choose the policies they desire.59 
 
The first clause of the trade and environment agenda of the Sierra Club is an 
affirmation of political diversity. Specifically, the right of all units of government to make 
their environmental regulations as strong as they wish, unrestricted by trade policy, 
provided that their regulations apply equally to domestic and foreign products. 
 
The environmental movement sees no need for a national or an international policy that 
sets a maximum standard for environmental protection and risk regulation. There are 
significant differences in income levels within federal states, just as there are between 
countries. These differences in income affect the demand and supply of legislation in 
many ways, including environmental protection and risk regulation. 
 
A decentralisation of environmental regulation allows each country, each tier of 
government, and each geographic unit of government within each tier, to make trade-
offs between environmental protection, risk regulation, and other values that are 
consistent with the values of the people within its jurisdiction. 
 
In the case of environmental law and the WTO, multiple democratic access is a priority 
for environmental NGOs. National sovereignty, several tiers of government, and 
geographically contiguous units of government within one country, allow the public to 
vote frequently and articulate their preferences in more detail. Each voter can choose 
the parties and political platforms that are tailored to their national, state and local 
concerns. Decentralisation enables a mobile public to move to those areas where 
environmental protection and other policies are most in line with their own preferences. 
 
There are, of course, concerns that inter-jurisdictional competition may lead to a 
dilution of environmental standards for both production- and consumption-generated 
environmental harm. Jurisdictions may become more timid about environmental policy 
because of fears of foreign competition, capital flight and industry mobility. 
Environmental protection efforts may be impeded if firms are able to make credible exit 
threats in response to increased environmental regulation. However, the evidence on 
inter-jurisdictional competition, although diverse in approach and findings, does not 
provide a compelling basis for fears of a major effect on industrial location of either 
weaker or stricter environmental regulations.60 
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Business and environmentalists are concerned about different public choice risks. The 
business community wants institutions that make it more difficult for politically articulate 
and shrewd minorities to lobby for (often-covert) regulatory protection from imports. 
Environmentalists are concerned that international trade agreements will slow-down 
the implementation of the will of the majority. Both concerns are reasonable. 
 
The idea of democracy is that large numbers of people participate in decisions and 
those decisions should reflect the views of the majority. However, if only because 
everyone spends time on the losing side of issues and elections, minority views should 
not be ignored but neither should they trump the will of the majority. Writings on 
democracy strive to balance the tyranny of the majority and the tyranny of the minority.  
 
Constitutions and political institutions are compromises that ensure the will of the 
majority prevails, but not immediately, and not without overcoming bothersome 
obstacles intentionally placed in its path. The aim is to protect minorities from the 
occasionally intemperate or impassioned majority, with obstacles such as bills of rights, 
federalism and bicameral parliaments.61 Political institutions are also designed with the 
aim in mind of protecting the majority from well-organised, self-serving minorities, the 
privileged, and the wealthy. The regulation of campaign financing is an example. 
Parliamentary committee systems and freedom of information laws are other examples. 
 
The crux of the present issue is the design of regulatory and review institutions that 
resolve issues of scientific uncertainty in risk regulation in respect to goods that are 
traded. The environmental movement is distrustful of the new WTO institutions. Their 
concern is that disputes will be resolved in favour of trade over health, safety, the 
environment and conservation. Environmentalists prefer to retain the option to work for 
pace-setting decentralised solutions to environment and public health risks at the 
national, state and local levels. They also lobby for minimum standards at the 
multilateral level. The business community is more distrustful of national regulatory 
review institutions. They support the WTO’s disputes settlement understanding as a 
way to police protectionist capture of regulation at the national, state and local levels.  
 
Federal states have similar institutional compromises to the WTO to mitigate the risk of 
regulatory protectionism. Federal constitutions have modest formal legal checks on 
regulatory discrimination against out-of-state business.62 They also rely on democracy 
within states and competition between states (the threat of exit by investors and 
workers) to check regulatory protectionism at the sub-national level.63 
 
The WTO’s institutional compromise between the competing public choice risks is to 
ask members to sign a mutually binding agreement about the transparency of the 
processes by which national, state and local legislation are created and enforced. 
Under the WTO’s system of policed decentralisation, the member-countries agree to 
follow processes based on principles such as non-discrimination, the use of scientific 
reasoning and evidence in the design of risk regulation, and promising that the breath 
of regulatory responses should be narrowly tailored to the scope of the risk at hand.   
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8. Summing-up the opportunities and risks 
Integrating environmental concerns into trade agreements touches on a number of 
issues. Exporters are concerned about the use of health, safety and environmental 
regulations as non-tariff barriers. Environmentalists perceive trade policy as a means of 
raising national environmental standards at home and abroad and of inducing countries 
to become signatories to and abide by international environmental agreements.  
 
The environmental NGOs do have valid concerns about some aspects of the WTO. At 
times, the WTO agreements are complex and are not models of clarity in drafting. The 
WTO is a finely balanced compromise. The agreements are based on subtle 
judgements and a delicate balancing of competing considerations, which invites honest 
disagreement over priorities, interpretation, and implementation. 
 
The central WTO concern of environmental groups is that disputes panels may restrict 
pace-setting domestic environmental laws in high-level countries because they burden 
imports unduly or are without full scientific justification. The WTO might limit the ability 
of governments to raise food safety standards or to adopt precautionary measures to 
protect the environment from new hazards whose the risks were not well understood. 
Another concern of environmentalists is whether the trade benefits of the WTO’s 
disputes settlement process outweigh its costs in terms of regulatory flexibility, policy 
innovation and experimentation and national responsiveness to shifting public opinion.  
 
The integration of technological and democratic values into risk regulation requires the 
resolution of predictable problems in individual and social cognition of risk and its 
regulation. The SPS agreement sets a relatively low internationally agreed threshold 
test to facilitate this. The agreement ensures that differences between technocratic and 
popular judgments about regulating a particular risk is indeed the product of differences 
in values, rather than factual mistakes, selective attention and protectionist subterfuge. 
 
It is reasonable to ask whether the WTO’s processes may hamper the ability of national 
and sub-national governments to be genuine pacesetters in environmental law making 
and possibly eliminate non-science factors from standard setting. Environmentalists 
consider that the WTO disputes process encourages governments to converge to the 
relevant international standard for a particular regulation because such uniformity is 
likely to reduce the incidence of trade disputes. In countries with regulations that are 
more demanding than the international standard, the fear of environmentalists is that 
WTO compliance costs will lead to a harmonisation down to the international standard 
even in those cases where there is some scientific basis for stricter regulation. 
 
The environmental NGOs have proposed a number of changes to the WTO 
agreements. Some of their proposals, such as better interface between the WTO 
agreements and multilateral environmental agreements; greater transparency in the 
WTO’s decision processes, and surer facilitation of green labelling, have few domestic 
policy or export market access risks. 
 
Proposals that go beyond environmental advocacy, such as incorporating a stronger 
form of the precautionary principle into WTO disputes processes, and a weakening of 
the sound science requirement, have export market access risks. Important 
international safeguards against disguised protectionism in bio-security, food safety 
and other risk regulation in New Zealand’s export markets could be weakened.   25
References 
Anderson, K. 1997, “Social Policy Dimensions of Economic Integration: Environmental 
and Labor Standards” in Ito, T. and Krueger, A. (eds) Regionalism versus multilateral 
trade arrangements, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp. 57-84. 
 
Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. 1992, “Trade, the Environment and Public Policy” in 
Anderson, K. and Blackhurst, R. (eds) The greening of world trade issues, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, pp. 3-22. 
 
Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T. N. 1996, “Trade and the Environment: Does 
Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?”, in Bhagwati, J. and 
Hudec, R. (eds), Fair Trade and Harmonization:  Prerequisites for free trade? Vol. 1, 
Cambridge and London, MIT Press, pp. 159-223. 
 
Buchanan, J. 1994, “Notes on the Liberal Constitution”, Cato Journal, Vol.  14 (1), 
Spring-Summer, pp. 1-9. 
 
Easterbrook, F. 1988, “The Constitution of Business”, George Mason Law Review, Vol. 
11, pp. 53ff. 
 
Easterbrook, F. 1994, “The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice 
Perspective”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 107, pp. 1328-47. 
 
Esty, D. and Mendelsohn, R. 1998, “Moving from national to international 
environmental policy”, Policy Sciences, Vol. 31, pp. 225-235. 
 
Esty, D. 1999, “Economic Integration and the Environment”, in Vig, N. and Axelrod, R. 
(eds),  The Global Environment: Institutions, Law, and Policy, Washington, D.C. CQ 
Press, p. 190. 
 
Esty, D. 1994, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, Institute of 
International Economics. 
 
Farber, D. and Hudec, R. 1993, “Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye 
View of the Dormant Commerce Clause”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol 47.  pp. 1401. 
 
Friends of the Earth International 1999, Friends of the Earth International Position 
Paper: The Emperor Has No Clothes: Why It’s Time to Change the Way We Trade, 
Friends of the Earth International Home Page,  
www.foei.org/campaigns/WTO/WTO_emperor.htm.  
 
Friends of the Earth International 2001, The Citizens' Guide to Trade, Environment and 
Sustainability, Friends of the Earth International Home Page,  
www.foei.org/activist_guide/tradeweb/index.htm. 
 
Madison, J., Hamilton, A. and Jay, J. The Federalist Papers, Rossiter, C. (ed), New 
York: New American Library, 1961, No. 10. 
 
Oates, W. 1999, “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
37 (3), September, pp. 1120-49. 
   26
Public Citizen, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Cancer Prevention Coalition, 
Community Nutrition Institute, Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund, Wagner, J.M., and 
Goldman, P. 1997, Comments to the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation 
concerning European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), Public Citizen Home Page,  
www.citizen.org/pctrade/publications/gtwpubs.htm#WTO. 
 
Public Citizen 1999, Comments of Public Citizen Inc. Regarding U.S. Preparations for 
the World Trade Organization’s Ministerial Meeting Fourth Quarter 1999, Public Citizen 
Home Page, www.citizen.org/pctrade/publications/gtwpubs.htm#WTO. 
 
Public Citizen 2001a, Principles for International Harmonization Adopted by the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue February 12, 2000, Public Citizen Global Trade 
Watch Home Page, www.citizen.org/trade/harmonization/Principles/, visited 12 
November 2001. 
 
Public Citizen 2001b, What is Harmonization?, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch 
Home Page, www.citizen.org/trade/harmonization/articles.cfm?ID=4390, visited 12 
November 2001. 
 
Rawls, J. 1971, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, University of Harvard Press. 
 
Sek, L., Pregelj, V., and Wilson, A. 2000, RL30521: The World Trade Organization: 
The Debate in the United States, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for 
Congress, 12 April, Home Page of the National Library for the Environment,  
www.cnie.org/nle/inter-42.html, visited 21 May 2001. 
 
Sierra Club, A Fair Trade Bill of Rights, Sierra Club Home Page, no date, 
www.sierraclub.org/trade/ftaa/rights.asp, visited 5 May 2001. 
 
Sierra Club, Broken Promises: How the Clinton Administration is Trading Away Our 
Environment, Sierra Club Home Page,  
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/reports/broken.asp, visited 22 August 2000. 
 
Sierra Club 1997, Sierra Club Conservation Policies International Trade Policy, Sierra 
Club Home Page, www.sierraclub.org, visited 24 February 2000. 
 
Sierra Club 1999, White Paper on Environmentally Responsible Trade Negotiating 
Authority, 26 April, Sierra Club Home Page,  
www.sierraclub.org/trade/fasttrack/white.asp, visited 5 May 2001.  
 
Sierra Club 1997, WTO Panel Decision on EU-US Beef Hormone Dispute --- 
Preliminary Analysis, 30 May, Sierra Club Home Page,  
www.sierraclub.org/trade/environment/hormone.asp, visited 22 October 2001. 
 
Speech From The Throne Opening Of Parliament 1999. 
 
Staff of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 2001, Market Access for 
Developing Countries' Exports, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, 
Washington, DC, IMF Home Page, www.imf.org/external/np/madc/eng/042701.htm.  
 
Sunstein, C. 1997, “Bad Deaths”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 14 (3), May-
June, pp. 259-82.   27
 
Sunstein, C. 1998, “Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis”, Journal of Legal Studies,  
Vol. 29 (2), Part 2, June, pp. 1059-1103. 
 
Sunstein, C. 2001, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Sunstein, C. 2001, Republic.com, Princeton University Press. 
 
Sykes, A. 2000, “Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? Silly 
Question?”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 3 (2), June, pp. 257-64. 
 
Sykes. A. 1999, "Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade", 66 
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 66, Winter, p. 1. 
 
Sykes, A. 1999, “The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International 
Goods and Services Markets”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 2 (1), 
March, pp. 49-70. 
 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue 2000, Principles of International Harmonization, 
Public Citizen Home Page, www.harmonizationalert.org/tacd_principles.htm. 
 
Tullock, G. 2000, Government: Whose Obedient Servant? Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London. 
 
Wallach, L. and Sforza, M. 1999, Whose Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization 
and the Erosion of Democracy, Public Citizen, Washington, D.C. 
 
World Bank 2001, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 
Washington, D.C. 
 
World Trade Organization 2001, Setting disputes, The WTO’s ‘most individual 
contribution’, World Trade Organization Home Page, no date,  
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, visited 22 October 2001. 
 
World Wildlife Fund for Nature International 1998, WWF Legal Briefing The Final 
Report of the WTO Shrimp-Turtle Panel, Home Page of the World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature International, www.panda.org/resources/publications/sustainability/wto-papers. 
 
World Wildlife Fund International, Centre for International Environmental Law (US), 
Oxfam-GB and Community Nutrition Institute (US), Dispute Settlement in the WTO A 
Crisis for Sustainable Development A WWF International, Centre for International 
Environmental Law (US), Oxfam-GB and Community Nutrition Institute (US) Discussion 
Paper, no date, World Wildlife Fund International Home Page, 
 www.panda.org/resources/publications/sustainability/wto-papers. 
 